- June 4, Aybüke Özgün (ILLC), joint work with Francesco Bert (University of St Andrews)
Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision
We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The key idea we exploit to achieve non-omniscience focuses on topic- or subject-matter-sensitivity: a feature of belief states which is gaining growing attention in the recent literature.
Time: 16:00 – 17:30
Location: 117, Janskerkhof 2-3